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 The fall of the Berlin wall on 9 November 1989 marks a truly secular break 
in modern history. It was the first step in a series of events which entailed a 
profound redrawing of the global political map. Arguably, the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union in December 1991 was the single most important consequence 
of the fall of the wall. It ended the cold war between the then two super 
powers and their allies which had dominated politics, economics and cultural 
discourses of more than four decades after the end of World War II. With the 
end of Soviet rule, the dissolution of the European empires ended in principle. 
The world of nation states, based upon the principle of sovereign equality as it 
had been designed by the UN was now completed, with the new states 
emerging from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia included. 
Thus, an originally European political construct, the “Westphalian System,” 
was finally established in the post-imperial area and legitimized by the United 
Nations.  
 In this context German unification seems to be the most “natural” event of 
pure and simple normalization of a situation of the division of a nation which 
had lasted more than forty years and which had been felt by many as 
perverted and pathological. Obviously this feeling had been widespread 
among the Germans at least in 1949 when the two German states – the 
Federal Republic of Germany [FRG] and the German Democratic Republic 
[GDR] – were established. Both constitutions, the Basic Law of the FRG and 
the constitution of the GDR, presupposed more or less explicitly the continued 
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existence of the German Nation as one political entity. Hence, German 
unification was always regarded and termed as re-unification. However, in the 
decades after 1949 this sense of belonging to one political nation faded 
gradually away especially among the younger generation; it was more and 
more supplanted by the perception of Germany as a cultural nation, divided 
into two states. This was certainly the case in the FRG, but I have the 
impression that this observation holds also largely true at least for the younger 
generation of the GDR. For instance, in the Monday demonstrations which on 
its heyday, on October 23, 1989 amassed several hundreds of thousands of 
protesters in the streets of Leipzig, the dominating slogan was “We are the 
people”, demanding democracy from the ruling communist elite, rather than 
“We are one people”, demanding national unification. The largest mass 
manifestation, which took place in East Berlin on November 4th, 1989 with 
more than half a million participants and which has been regarded by many 
participants (as well as by observers) as the turning point in the overthrow of 
the regime, called for the realization of two articles of the GDR constitution: 
the freedoms of speech and of assembly. They desired the same amount of 
freedom which the citizens of Western democracies enjoyed; actually, they 
wanted to become a variety of a Western democracy. At that time national 
unification was not on the top of their agenda. 
However this may be, in other respects the project of German unification was 
by no means a political matter of course in the months after the fall of the wall. 
After all, formally Germany consisted of two independent states both of which 
had become members of the UN in September 1973; independent statehood 
and widespread international recognition as such constitute important 
institutional facts in the world of politics and of international law. Moreover, at 
the end of the eighties the development of the European Economic 
Community began to spill over into the field of politics, and the first signs of 
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Europeanization tended to relativize the importance of national unification. 
Last, but not least, the continuing common responsibility of the four Allies of 
World War II for Germany as a whole reminded the Germans of the truism 
that their national unification was not a domestic matter of the Germans alone, 
but an international affair which was of utmost concern in particular of their 
European neighbours. As is generally known, German unification was only 
possible because the two German states unambiguously declared in the 
Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany of September 12, 
1990 (the so-called Two Plus Four Agreement) that “The united Germany has 
no territorial claims whatsoever against other states and shall not assert any 
in the future” (Article 1 para. 3). 
True, in some other respects German unification was only a further case of a 
general pattern, namely the pattern of transition from an authoritarian 
communist regime to a system of liberal democracy cum market economy 
which pertained to the East and Central European states formerly under 
Soviet domination. Thus, for forty years the GDR had been a member of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the Comecon; it had shared the fate 
of the Soviet satellite states of economic neglect and mismanagement which 
had produced utterly underdeveloped and inefficient economies in all these 
states. In this respect the GDR is well comparable with the other post-soviet 
countries. However, on balance the GDR’s transition from communism to 
liberal democracy remains a special and unique case because it entailed the 
vanishing of this state through the merger with another state, the Federal 
Republic of Germany. [The opposite case has been the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia into two separate independent states] Obviously the German 
case meant a clash of very different economic, political, legal, in part also 
cultural, and mental patterns within one state. It is this particularity of 
transition which renders German unification a special case worth studying. In 
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what follows, I have selected three aspects:  
First, the institutional paradigm of unification – has German unification been 
founded upon a new social contract between the people of the two states or 
has it been based upon the shared sense of common belonging to the 
German nation? Obviously this question pertains to the relationship between 
the nation and the constitution as two different modes of political integration. 
Secondly, I will discuss the tension, alleged or real, between the Basic Law's 
simultaneous commitment to supra-national integration and to the German 
nation state.  
Thirdly and finally, I will deal with the thorny issue of "transitional justice" as 
one of the most haunting problems of all post-communist societies.  
 
I. The institutional paradigm of unification 
As we know, from a purely technical point of view there was no need to create a 
new constitution for the united Germany because the political leaders of the post-
communist GDR had decided to join the Federal Republic by accession and, as a 
consequence, to have the Basic Law extended over what had been the GDR. This 
option was offered by the then Article 23 of the Basic Law which defined the 
territorial scope of the Basic Law and stipulated that it had to be put into force “in 
other parts of Germany on their accession”. Thus, for many problems which the 
other post-communist transition countries had to solve on their own and from 
scratch, ready-made patterns of solutions were provided by the proved and tested 
legal order of the Federal Republic. However, the availability of a successful 
constitution per se did not provide the answer to the question of how to adapt the 
basic parameters of the order of the GDR to the requirements of the Basic Law. 
Even more importantly, the desire of the majority of the populace of the GDR to 
accede to the Federal Republic was not a guarantee that their mental state was 
attuned to the implicit values and assumptions of the Basic Law and to the mental 
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state of those who had lived under it for forty years.  Empirical research suggests 
that democratic constitutions tend to be the more stable the more their "authority 
pattern is congruent with the other authority patterns of the society of which [they 
are] a part"1. Of course, in free societies one will never find a congruence in the 
strict sense of identity of public and societal authority patterns; what is required is "a 
pattern of graduated resemblances" which allows mutual responsiveness between 
the formal authority patterns of state and of civil society within a country. It was 
doubtful whether such a resemblance between the institutional solidifications and 
mental formations of the GDR and the structural requirements of the Basic Law in 
fact could exist. For it could be expected that forty years of communist rule (not to 
mention the impact of the preceding twelve years of Nazism) had left mental traces 
in terms of world views, expectations, habits and attitudes which were discordant 
with essential premises of the Basic Law. After all, also the West Germans had 
needed two decades before they were able to fully internalize the innovative force of 
the Basic Law. In one word, the implantation of a ready-made constitution into a 
society which lacks experience in its operation, corresponding institutions and 
responsive value orientations, was probably a more difficult project than the 
challenge imposed on the other East and Central European states which had to 
manage the transition of a non-democratic into a democratic society solely with the 
help of their own resources.  
Let me briefly explain the implications of the – at a first glance so easy – GDR’s 
path of transition through merger with the other German state.  
The accession of the GDR to the FRG was formally a unilateral act of the 
'Volkskammer' (parliament) of the GDR. Neither the government nor the people of 
the Federal Republic were allowed to participate in this decision, much less to reject 
the accession. However, it was admissible and in fact necessary that the terms of 
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the GDR’s accession be specified in a mutual agreement of the two governments 
which was codified in the Unification Treaty of August 31, 1990 (two months before 
unification). Concerning the bargaining power of the two sides this treaty was clearly 
asymmetrical as the desire of the GDR to unite with the Federal Republic was 
unconditional. The situation was paradoxical: whereas the West Germans had no 
say in the decision of the East Germans that they wanted to form a common state 
with the West Germans, the East Germans had no say in the determination of the 
conditions under which they would live together with the West Germans, and after 
the implementation of their decision their state would fade away, whilst the Federal 
Republic would continue to exist. Once the Easterners declared their accession to 
the Federal Republic, the quasi-self-operating extension of the Basic Law over their 
country would be the immediate consequence. This constitutional construction did 
not look very much like the foundation of a new common polity by way of the fusion 
of the two partners into a new polity.  
 This constitutional construction of the unification is not a mere technicality of 
constitutional law; it is of great political significance. It implies the unification of two 
states, not necessarily the formation of one political nation. The former – the 
unification of two states – requires the smooth technical operation of the institutions 
of public authority, the latter – the formation of one political nation – envisions the 
fruition of a shared understanding of why people want to live together in a common 
polity. It was this latter path to unification which the framers of the Basic Law had in 
mind in 1949 when they stipulated in its final article – Article 146 – that the Basic 
Law shall cease to be in force on the day on which a constitution adopted by a free 
decision of the German people comes into force. Given the expectation of the 
framers that a united German nation state would soon be reestablished, the 
transitory constitution of a transitory state – the Federal Republic – lost its raison 
d'être once the whole German people was able to re-constitute itself as one polity. 
Against their hopes and expectations this condition materialized only forty years 
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later.  
Unsurprisingly, the conditions which the framers had envisioned when they devised 
Article 146 had fundamentally changed until 1989. Now, more than one generation 
later, the constituent power of the German people which Article 146 presupposed as 
a matter of course comprised individuals who had been brought up and socialized in 
two very different social orders. Hence, despite the unequivocal will of the great 
majority of the GDR-Germans to unite with the FRG it was far from clear whether 
the peoples of the two German semi-states shared the same ideas about the 
character and the objectives of their forthcoming common polity. On this view Article 
146 could turn out as an ambiguous legacy of the founding men and women of the 
Basic Law. For Article 146 authorized the constituent power to put an end to the 
Basic Law and to replace it with a completely new constitution without being bound 
by any preceding procedural or substantive rules. After the East Germans had 
overthrown the communist regime and opted for unification with West Germany, 
obviously the situation had eventuated which the framers of the Basic Law had 
envisioned in 1949 and which endowed the whole German people with its original 
constituent power to create a new polity. But, as I observed, it surfaced with a delay 
of more than one generation, and this might have corroded the underlying premise 
of a persistent common understanding of how the united nation of the Germans 
should look like in its political setup. The stakes were high at least for the West 
Germans. After all, essential constitutional and extra-constitutional achievements of 
the West German state, particularly its integration into the inter- and supranational 
organizations of the West, could have been withdrawn by the constituent power of 
the whole German people.  
Given the desperate desire of the vast majority of East Germans to accept the West 
German model of society almost unconditionally, this potentiality seemed to be a 
purely theoretical concern. Still, these concerns did exist in some West German 
circles, and they played a role in the strategy to discard the path to unification 
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predetermined by Article 146 and to opt for the alternative of Article 23 which 
allowed a mere unilateral accession of the GDR to the Basic Law. These concerns 
may not have been fully futile. For it could not be totally excluded that, once the 
constituent power of the people was released, the process could assume a dynamic 
resulting in highly unpredictable outcomes. New alliances and societal coalitions 
between FRG people and GDR people could produce new majorities with respect to 
some important constitutional issues and hence create constitutional facts which 
might diverge considerably from those embodied in the Basic Law. We can find 
examples when we look at the constitution which was drafted by a subcommittee of 
the Round Table and sanctioned by the Round Table shortly before its dissolution 
end of March 1990. As you know, the Round Table consisted of representatives of 
the old regime and of the different organizations and initiatives of the citizens’ 
movement and hence can be regarded as the political representation of the GDR in 
the period between the beginning of December 1989 and the formation of the first 
democratically elected government at the beginning of April 1990. Although the 
Volkskammer - the parliament of the GDR elected on March 18, 1990 – refused to 
discuss this draft constitution because the deputies feared that a new constitution 
for the GDR could become an instrument for the continuation of the GDR as an 
independent state, its content may well give hints about what the GDR people might 
have considered as necessary elements of a common constitution. For instance, 
the draft constitution of the Round Table contained a list of economic and social 
rights (such as the rights to an appropriate lodging, to labor, and to education), a 
tough public control over the natural resources, and a system of state financing of 
political parties which differed considerably from the system of the FRG.  
The details are no longer important, as obviously the political elites of the two 
German states dismissed the option of invoking the constituent power of the 
German people as a whole and chose instead the alternative offered by Article 23. 
This quasi-administrative solution promised a more even process of unification than 
  
 9
 
the political path since it clearly enhanced its rapidness. Given the risk that the 
window of opportunity which had been opened in November 1989 could close at 
any time in view of the uncertain situation in the Soviet Union, there were good 
reasons for this choice. On the other hand it must not be forgotten that a 
revolutionary process triggered in Germany at another 9th of November, namely 
November 9, 1918, entailed the election of a constituent National Assembly and the 
enactment of a new constitution no later than in the following August of 1919. In 
other words, this process required less time than the seemingly smooth process of 
German unification seventy years later. However, it is idle to speculate how a similar 
method of re-constitution of the German nation might have looked like in 1989 and 
1990. Still, it must not be ignored that a price had to be paid for the non-utilization of 
Article 146. I will turn to this point shortly.  
The choice of Art. 23 as the path to unification had the implication that  only few 
amendments of the Basic Law were considered necessary and in fact enacted as a 
consequence of the accession of the GDR. Rather, the law of the GDR had to be 
adjusted to the normative requirements of the Basic Law. As to the Basic Law, a 
new Article 143 was inserted which in its para. 1 established a time period of 27 
months for the adjustment of law of the former GDR to the requirements of the 
Basic Law. A prominent issue was the abortion law of the GDR which diverged from 
that of the FRG in that it permitted the free choice of the woman to perform an 
abortion in the first three months of pregnancy. This interim period of two different 
abortion regimes in Germany lasted until June 1993 when the more restrictive 
regime determined by the rules of the Basic Law became binding in the whole 
country.  
Another implication of the path of Article 23 is worth mentioning, although it is less 
tangible. It has to do with the price which had to be paid for the smooth path to 
unification. Since the Germans in the East and the West lacked the experience of a 
joint venture to discuss with each other, to listen to each other, to argue and to 
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compromise with each other and finally to establish a shared constitutional 
fundament for their future common polity feelings of mutual misunderstanding, 
distrust, and cultural alienation have played a considerable role in the last twenty 
years of the united Germany. In some parts of the population both in the East and 
the West these feelings persist and may even transferred into the next generation. 
The desire to rely upon the common national heritage in terms of our common 
language and culture which prevailed on both sides could not fully overcome the 
persistence of the different mental imprints which forty years of division and of the 
experience of quite disparate social orders had created and which might have been 
reduced in the common experience to generate a political union among them.  
 
II. The Basic Law's simultaneous commitment to supra-national integration and to 
the German nation state 
 As mentioned, the Basic Law was supposed to be the temporary constitution of 
an incomplete and transitory state -- that is why it was called 'Basic Law' rather than 
'Constitution'. Its life-span was expected to be short: no more than a few years until 
unification came about with the Eastern parts of the country then controlled by the 
Soviet Union and its German communist affiliates. This was the main reason why 
the founders refrained from two elements that they themselves actually thought 
necessary for a full-fledged constitution and which therefore they put off for the 
definitive constitution of a re-united Germany. First, they eschewed the design of a 
basic structure of the social and economic order (as laid down in all 'Laender' (state) 
constitutions which were created after 1945 and prior to the Basic Law) and, 
second, they made no effort to sanction the Basic Law by a plebiscite.  
 After forty years of West Germany's continual progress to becoming a major 
economic power, a viable democratic society, and a respected member of the 
international community of nations, almost everybody inside and outside West 
Germany was convinced that time had made permanent the once self-proclaimed 
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temporary and transitory character of the state and its Basic Law. Though the 
official state goal of re-unification was never abandoned – not least due to the 
jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court which insisted that the other state 
organs stuck to this constitutional objective – there emerged a more or less tacit 
understanding that the Federal Republic was a full-fledged state with a full-fledged 
constitution that did not deserve any longer to be regarded and treated as a 
transitional phenomenon. This development was corroborated by another 
constitutional commitment of the Basic Law which seemed to point into a direction 
opposite to the objective of national unification. In was laid down in Article 24 para. 
1 and stipulated that “the Federation may by legislation transfer sovereign powers to 
international organizations”. Note that according to traditional constitutional and 
state law the transfer of sovereign powers of a state always required an explicit 
authorization through constitutional amendment – in the case of Article 24 no more 
than a mere statute was required which could be enacted with simple 
parliamentarian majority. By lowering the constitutional hurdles of a transfer of 
sovereignty the framers of the Basic Law intended to emphasize the seriousness of 
the Federal Republic’s openness to the international community and its commitment 
to new forms of international cooperation.  
In fact, Article 24 Basic Law became the constitutional fundament of West 
Germany’s integration into the European Communities in the fifties of the previous 
century. There was an obvious tension between the goal of national unity and the 
goal of international integration which became a key matter of political  conflict in 
West German politics in the 1950s. During those years chancellor Adenauer pushed 
towards West Germany’s integration in the West, including NATO, against the 
vigorous resistance of considerable parts of the population, represented politically 
by the Social Democratic Party. The Social Democrats presumed that international 
integration would necessarily endanger or definitively frustrate national reunification. 
Even after the Social Democrats had finally come to accept West Germany's 
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international integration into Nato, the EEC and other European supranational 
institutions, it was still widely held that national unification and international 
integration were ultimately incompatible under the given circumstances of the cold 
war. Nobody could imagine that the Soviet Union would ever be prepared to permit 
unification without demanding in return that a united Germany abandon its inte-
gration into the different Western inter- and supranational organizations. It is not by 
accident that the West European allies of the Federal Republic were much less 
enthusiastic about German unifications than most of the Germans themselves.  
 While it appeared that in the fifties the majority of West Germans were still ready 
to pay a price of this sort for their national unity, it became evident in the seventies 
that such a majority no longer existed. The generation born after World War II in 
particular could hardly imagine that there could be a potential tension which would 
force them to a painful choice in a “moment of decision”. In other words, among the 
three principal strategic options of West Germany's politics -- namely, (1) national 
unification at the expense of international integration into the West; (2) international 
integration into the West at the expense of national re-unification; and, (3) national 
unification and at the same time international integration --, only the second seemed 
realistic and, given the circumstances, also desirable at least for most West 
Germans of the younger generation. The first alternative was disagreeable on 
several grounds; it could jeopardize the political and military stability of Europe and, 
moreover, if pursued, would probably provoke the resistance of the three Western 
allies. The third alternative seemed ideal for many, but hopelessly unavailable. And 
yet, in the end, it was just this alternative, which nobody except some political 
dreamers had anticipated, that materialized and finally resolved the tension 
between these two main goals of the West German constitution. As you know, the 
European currency Union introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, signed on February 
7, 1992 and entered into force on 1 November 1993, was Germany’s major pledge 
that it would stick to and develop its integration into the institutional framework of 
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the West. After all, it entailed the end of the Deutschmark in which many Germans 
took so much national pride.  
 It is worth mentioning here that at the beginning of the 1990s a reversal of the 
political frontlines of the 1950s surfaced in the Federal Republic. Although the 
majority of the Social Democrats and their candidate Oskar Lafontaine did not flatly 
oppose German unification, in 1990 they argued for slowing down the process. 
Such caution was necessary because they unequivocally gave priority to West 
Germany's roots in and commitments to the West European inter- and 
supranational organizations. Given Chancellor Kohl's and the CDU's credibility in 
their fidelity to Germany's integration in the West and Kohl's simultaneous 
successful push towards unification, the Social Democrats' position, asserting that 
these two claims were incompatible or that there was at least a serious tension 
between them, appeared a bit outdated to many German voters. Consequently the 
SPD lost the first all-German elections in December 1990 by a wide margin.  
 All this sounds very much like a happy end. However, the story is not yet over. 
Given the huge economic burdens which Germany, and most prominently the West 
German economy, had and still have to shoulder in order to establish “legal and 
economic unity, especially uniform living conditions” in the united country (see 
Article 72 para. 2 Basic Law) many Western governments, the EEC, and the 
international economic community at large were concerned that Germany might 
shift both its economic resources and its political attention to the reconstruction of 
its eastern states. They feared that Germany might become more unable and more 
reluctant to further the process of economic and political integration of (Western) 
Europe. Chancellor Kohl did not fully realize this problem, or, when he realized it, he 
minimized it. He contended that neither West German tax payers nor the EEC 
would suffer from his drive to immediate German unification. It may be the case that 
national unification could only be achieved because political leaders simply 
neglected its economic implications. Given the more than twelve billion 
  
 14
 
Deutschmarks which had to be paid to the Soviet Union in order to buy the approval 
of its leaders, and given the more than hundred billions which had to be transferred 
in order to create approximately equal economic and social conditions in the old and 
the new 'Laender', it is not surprising to observe that the German economy has 
been under considerable stress in the last twenty years. Unsurprisingly, the red-
green government which came to power in 1998, was the first German post-war 
government which, albeit moderately, played the card of economic patriotism vis-à-
vis the European Union. And it is not by accident that the only German party 
represented in the Bundestag which rejects the Lisbon Treaty is Die Linke, basically 
the renamed GDR regime party SED which is deeply rooted in the new Laender. 
Ironically, its president is Oskar Lafontaine who left the SPD shortly after the red-
green government under Schröder took office and joined (and reshaped) the Linke.  
III. The issue of transitional justice 
 The fusion of East Germany with West Germany did not mean that the problems 
which burden a society in transition from communist rule to a regime of liberal 
democracy were, as it were, absorbed in the new German state. They were as 
difficult and the solutions were as contested as they were in the other post-
communist countries of East and Central Europe. The transition from authoritarian 
regimes to liberal democracies (as they have occurred in Latin America and Latin 
Europe after 1974 and in Central East Europe and elsewhere - Korea, South Africa 
- after 1989) pose not just, after the rupture, the "forward-looking" problems of 
creating a new political order and promoting its consolidation. They also pose the 
"backward-looking" problem of "transitional justice". I define transitional justice “as 
the conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized 
by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor 
regimes”2. Transitional justice provides criteria for answers to the question of how to 
deal with the persons, events, and rights violations that occurred under the old 
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regime whose political, military, administrative, academic etc. elites are still around. 
These answers range from attempts to "draw a thick line" through amnesty and 
amnesia to practices known as "memoralization", criminal prosecution of 
perpetrators, administrative purges (vetting, "lustration"), restitution, compensation 
and rehabilitation of victims, ban of organizations and media, confiscation of 
property, apologies, and acts of "political" and "administrative" (as opposed to 
"legal") justice. 
The East Germans shared and share these problems with the other post-communist 
societies of East and Central Europe, but they enjoy the unique advantage of not 
having to solve them all by themselves. However, some of these problems may 
have been aggravated rather than mitigated by the fact that overcoming the heritage 
of communist rule has to be managed within the framework of national unification 
under the aegis of the Basic Law. This applies particularly to the issue of the 
privatization of a vast amount of state property which I will address first. After that I 
will briefly turn to the field of reparations, restitution, and compensation for regime 
injustices which caused damages in of a more immaterial kind.  
The privatization of state-owned property, both real estate and businesses, presents 
one of the most serious difficulties in all post-communist countries. The problem is 
not only one of developing adequate procedures for the transfer of huge assets to 
private owners and to prevent wild privatizations through large-scale theft of the old 
regime elites. An even more difficult problem is the protection of the legal acquirers 
of property against claims from former owners or, to put the problem the other way 
round, to satisfy the claims of former owners without deterring potential investors, 
The Unity Treaty made the important distinction between expropriations that had 
been conducted between 1945 and 1949, i.e. before the existence of the GDR and 
hence under the auspices of the Soviet Union, and expropriations under the aegis 
of the GDR. The former were declared irreparable in the Unification Treaty. During 
the unification negotiations, the irreversibility of those expropriations was one of the 
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essentials urged by the Prime Minister of the GDR, strongly supported by the Soviet 
Union. Interestingly, the Joint Declaration of the two German governments 
concerning the Regulation of Open Property Questions, states that the Soviet Union 
and the GDR see no possibility of revising the measures taken between 1945 and 
1949, while the Federal government limited itself to the statement that "it takes note 
of this result in light of the historical development". The immunity of this category of 
expropriations from restitutions is now protected by an amendment which 
incorporates their irreversibility into the constitution (Article 143 para. 3).3. In April 
1991, the Federal Constitutional Court acknowledged this amendment as 
constitutional; but the Court insisted that within this framework some kind of 
compensation has to be provided4. In 1995 the Bundestag enacted a law which 
fulfilled this requirement and regulated the details of a compensation for the victims 
of the expropriations under the auspices of the Soviet Union5. Until our days it is a 
matter of dispute whether in fact the irreversibility of those expropriations was a 
strict and non-negotiable condition of German unification6. Still, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court has repeatedly confirmed its opinion that Article 143 para 3 – 
i.e., the irreversibility of the expropriations between 1945 and 1949 – does not 
violate the essential principles of the Basic Law as codified in Article 79 paragraph 
3. Although this is now definitively res judicata, the political conflict over this issue 
persists; the affected persons have a quite strong lobby.   
 In contrast, expropriations by the formerly sovereign authorities of the GDR must 
be undone. Attachment III to the Unification Treaty, a Joint Declaration of the 
governments of the FRG and the GRD of June 15, 1990 established the principle 
that restitution of property to the former owners or their heirs had priority over 
                     
    
3
 See Quint, Peter E. (1991) The Constitutional Law of German Unification. To be published in the 
University of Maryland Law Review. 
    
4
 Decision of April 23, 1991 [1 BvR 1170, 1174, 1175/90] BVerfGE 84, 90;confirmed by decision of 18 
April 1996 [1 BvR 1452, 1459/90, 2031/94] BverfGE 94, 12. 
5
 Entschädigungs- und AusgleichsleistungsG v. 27. Sept. 1994, BGBl. I, S. 2624. 
6
 See the detailed account of the arguments pro and con in BVerfGE 94, 12 [34 et seq.].  
  
 17
 
compensation. Only if a return of the former property is not possible -- e.g. if the 
property has been assigned to public functions or dissolved into larger business 
units -- compensation had to be paid instead of restitution. After unification huge 
numbers of restitution claims were filed, especially with respect to real estate, and 
most of them came from the citizens of the former Federal Republic. Obviously this 
created uncertainty and delayed urgently needed investment. Several laws were 
enacted which aimed at mitigating this situation, but the burden of proof for the 
potential investor remained rather heavy. Together with other circumstances this 
contributed to quite low rate of investment in the new Laender.  
 The underlying constitutional problem in this area resides in the imperfect 
connection between the economic function of property and justice. The economic 
function of private property does not necessarily coincide with those principles of 
justice embedded in the principle of restitution. In a dynamic capitalist economy 
property is best allocated to those who will make the most efficient use of it in the 
future, that is, to those who invest. In contrast, the principle of restitution is devoted 
to the goal of justice; property is assigned to those who deserve it because they or 
their families suffered injustice in the past. If the rectification of past injustice enjoys 
priority over the principle of allocation to potential investors, economic efficiency is 
likely to be severely restricted. It is one of the characteristics of all the East and 
Central European revolutions that they aimed simultaneously to achieve justice and 
to introduce a market economy. Now they must deal with the reality that the imple-
mentation of both principles simultaneously is not possible. Again, what at a first 
glance seemed to be a particular advantage enjoyed by the East Germans in 
comparison with the other post-communist countries -- namely their accession to 
the Federal Republic and their incorporation into an established economic, legal, 
and political order -- may have made their problems even more difficult. The East 
Germans did not have the possibility of arriving at a pragmatic solution to the 
problem of restitution, because those who would be hurt by pragmatism -- West 
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Germans -- were able to force the Easterners to adhere to those constitutional 
standards that embody a rigorous and conventional concept of property.  
 In retrospection, in the field of transitional justice the protection of property was 
clearly the predominant element. This becomes manifest if we compare the politics 
of property restitutions with the compensations afforded to the victims of injustice 
who did not lose property but rather immaterial goods like freedom, health, the 
opportunity for a higher education or a professional career according to their talents 
and skills. Article 17 of the Unification Treaty promised the legal regulation of the 
rehabilitation of those individuals who under the communist regime had become 
victims of arbitrary court decisions. This was a rather restrictive concept of 
rehabilitation, because victimization was not carried out primarily by the courts but 
by administrative institutions or by state-owned enterprises. After unification the 
Bundestag took that into account and enacted laws which grant compensation also 
for victims of serious acts contrary to rule of law committed by administrative 
agencies, in cases like, for instance, forced evacuation out of the border area, or 
the refusal of appropriate and available medical treatment7. The Employment 
Rehabilitation Act established the right to compensation for those former residents 
of the GDR who had suffered serious discrimination and disadvantages in their 
professional career, such as prohibition to attend a university or to continue a career 
in the field of vocational and professional specialization. In both cases the amount 
of compensation has remained quite modest, including the amount of the rights to 
old age pension which the Employment Rehabilitation Act affords.  
IV. Concluding remark 
 German unification has been a uniquely huge social experiment. In contrast to 
scientific experiments, its effects cannot be confined to a laboratory. The transition 
from an authoritarian political regime and its concomitant command economy to a 
liberal democracy and a market economy is as unprecedented as the short-term 
                     
7
 VerwaltungsrehabilitierungsG [Adminstrative Rehabilitation Act] of June 23, 1994  
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integration of two extremely different societies -- one liberal-capitalist, one authori-
tarian-socialist -- into one nation state. There is no constitutional pattern for either of 
these processes, much less so for the management of both simultaneously. Of 
course, in a way every historical situation is unparalleled, and it would be naive to 
expect any concrete conjuncture to fit into our traditional, accumulated wisdom. 
However, modern societies have developed a method for coping actively with the 
unexpected emergence of new experiences: namely the creation of constitutions. 
Constitutions symbolize the foundation of a new polity; they contain the founding 
generation's reflection of new social and spiritual experiences; and it is through 
constitutions that the distinctiveness of a historical situation is transmitted to 
succeeding generations. In this respect, the constitutional aspects of German 
unification are somewhat tedious in view of the exciting and inspiring historical 
singularity of the events which opened the window for Germany’s unification in the 
first place. The procedure of unification was treated with utmost professional-
administrative expertise and competence embodied in a sophisticated treaty 
between two states – but nothing in that treaty betrays the joyfulness of millions of 
people who for the first time since almost sixty years could proudly say: “We, the 
people establish a democratic polity”.  
 
